Kant's Prolegomena Precis One

Sorry this got posted so late.

Kant’s “Prolegomena” (5-31, 143-158)

Preface:
In the preface, Kant introduces the main idea behind the Prolegomena – whether such a thing as metaphysics is possible at all. He writes that his requirements for metaphysics are the only ones that can determine such a science, and because there has been no such thing before, metaphysics has never really existed. He then speaks of Hume’s questioning of metaphysics, regarding cause and effect, and how others opposed Hume, appealing to sound common sense, which seemed to be the basis of metaphysics previously. Kant then defines sound common sense as a matter of judgments that finds its immediate application in experience, in opposition to speculative understanding, which happens when judgments are made in a universal mode out of mere concepts. Kant ends with the statement that sound common sense has no judgment here, and that in the rest of this writing, he will be constructing metaphysics as a completely new science.

Preamble on the Distinguishing Feature of All Metaphysical Cognition:
In the preamble, Kant writes that in order to understand metaphysics, or the science of knowledge, one must first understand it separately from other sciences. To separate it, he divides metaphysical judgments into two categories – analytical and synthetic. Analytical judgments are those that are explicative and add nothing to the cognition of the judgment. They rest entirely on the principle of contradiction, and are as such a priori knowledge. Synthetic judgments augment the given condition of an object, and can either be a posteriori (empirical), or a priori (arise from understanding or reason). Synthetic judgments include judgments of experience, mathematical judgments, and properly metaphysical judgments.

General Question of Prolegomena – Is metaphysics possible at all?:
In the general question of the Prolegomena, Kant states that the purpose of the Prolegomena is to indicate what needs to be done in order to bring the science of metaphysics around, rather than only presenting it. He says that to do so, one must rely on something already dependable, and therefore must use in majority analytic judgments. However, Kant then states that pure synthetic cognition that is a priori is actual and given, and these are mostly pure mathematics and natural science, because they are known independent of experience.

Prolegomena General Question – How is cognition from pure reason possible?:
In this section, Kant says that since we can understand both analytic propositions (from the principle of contradiction) and synthetic propositions that are a posteriori (from experience and a synthesis of perceptions), we must then move to understanding synthetic propositions that are a priori. One would usually think that only experience can provide us with the connection of one concept to another, through a long-standing habit, however, to refute such, Kant uses the examples of pure mathematics and pure natural science. He then poses the four questions of 1 → how is pure mathematics possible? 2 → how is pure natural science possible? 3 → how is metaphysics in general possible? and 4 → how is metaphysics as science possible?

Preface to the Second Edition – To Metaphysics:
In the preface, Kant writes that, in order to understand a priori knowledge, intuition must not conform to the constitution of the objects, but instead the object must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition. That is to say, we must not say we know things because of what we see in the object, but instead understand the object because of what we know already. He writes that in cognition that is a priori, nothing can be attributed to objects except what the thinking subject takes from itself. Therefore, in order to cognize an object, we must understand a corresponding intuition, or think of the object as a thing in itself, and we then can cognize the object through appearance. When we cognize something, we then do both – understand its appearance in accordance with natural law (which makes it not free), and understand it in accordance with its ability to belong as a thing to itself (as being free). This is both sensory and intellectual understanding. Kant then goes on to talk about the Critique as a necessary preliminary foundation for the advancement of metaphysics as a science.

Introduction & The Transcendental Document of Elements:
In this section, Kant introduces the special science of the Critique of Pure Reason. He writes that reason is the faculty that supplies the principles of a priori cognition, and states that he is trying to understand a priori synthesis. He then defines intuition as a relation to objects immediately (a purely sensational data), and sensibility as how we obtain representations through the way in which we are affected by the object. Sensibility gives us the object, which then gives intuition, and is then the appearance. He then splits appearance into the “matter of appearance” which corresponds to the sensation, and is a posteriori, and the “form of appearance” which is that in which sensations can be ordered and arranged, and is a priori. Kant writes that pure representations (or pure intuition) are those which are not found by the senses, and therefore a priori. These are extension and shape. The science of these a priori principles of sensibility are called the transcendental aesthetic. In such, Kant says that he will isolate sensibility by taking away all additions through concepts, and then separating out all sensation, leaving only an a priori understandings of two things – space and time.

Questions:

1. Kant writes that sound common sense has no ground in metaphysics, due to their direct application of experience, but then says some synthetic judgments can be empirical. Are those synthetic judgments not then considered as sound common sense?

2. Kant writes that an understanding of an object is both free and not free, but says that it is not a contradiction. How is this so?

Jane and Jerica's Kant Review, 3/29-3/31

Last week, we discussed the first and second parts of Kant’s “Main Transcendental Question.” These asked how pure mathematics and pure science are possible. Pure is synonymous with a priori for Kant.

First, we distinguished empirical intuition from pure intuition. Empirical intuition is that which can be known from the senses while pure intuition is that which can be known without experience, or a priori. We also distinguished analytic from synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments are explicative, in that they do not add to our knowledge of the object, they mere define it, e.g. “All bachelors are unmarried men” Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, expand our knowledge of an object, and are therefore ampliative, e.g. “All bodies are heavy.” Experience is the product of intuitions and concepts, through the conjoining of which we can know objects and make judgments (as they appear to us). Metaphysics is concerned with synthetic a priori judgments/knowledge in so far as they relate to nature. Mathematics is mired in intuitive knowledge, but metaphysics goes beyond numbers/quantities through the use of discursive concepts (qualities + quantities = the world).

Next, we addressed how if having reason makes one human, (as may be deduced from Descartes’ argument that reason is the means to truth) then the argument can be made that women or people of other races do not have reason and, thus, are not fully human or are less human. For Kant, however, the means to truth is not based on reason. The means to truth is based on our intuition and is, thus, universal.
We also addressed the question: How is a priori intuition possible? It is important to distinguish things in themselves (noumena) from the appearances of objects (phenomena). All of our knowledge is of appearances, since we cannot know things in themselves. Material intuition, or sensation, cannot be given a priori. However, there are two forms of a priori intuition: space and time. Space and time are structures of the mind we impose upon the world and necessarily shape our “experience” of objects in accordance with concepts (rules), because we cannot intuit or experience anything that does not participate in space or time.

The Table of Categories is the result of combining the Table of Judgments with the two a priori forms of intuition: space and time. All thought and representations of objects (as they appear to us) must find their way into these 12 a priori concepts in order to have objective validity. We prescribe the laws of nature because no object appears to us or participates in the world that does not adhere to the rules of our thought, so therefore the world must follow them.

We hope this is a helpful summary. Here are a couple of questions we didn't get to cover in class that you might want to ponder:

1.Kant begins with the assumption that mathematics consist of a priori cognitions. i.e. that we have concepts of space and time before experience. Do you agree? Do space and time exist apart from ourselves? Are space and time as we conceive them?

2.Can we create universal laws from our individual judgments of perception? If objects are as we individually perceive them and not a reality in themselves, how can we know that we are perceiving the same way? Using Kant’s own example, how do we know that the sun on the rock produces the same sensation in all of us?

Are Virtues a Convenience?

On Page 187, starting at the word "Suppose" and continuing through the word "attention" Hume makes an argument for the virtuous man who is delivered into a "society of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and government." In this argument, he is addressing Justice as a virtue, however I wonder if not all virtues are being disregarded in his example. Either way, he argues that a virtuous man, put into such a dire situation is not only forgiven for, but expected to, disregard what many argue is the very essence of 'man,' being the conscious decisions to act morally. Instead Hume says that such a man should revert to a more primitive, and animalistic behavior [a property belonging to the body not the mind] of self preservation. I take this to mean that the man is to literally lower himself to the level of the "ruffians" he lives with in order to maintain his existence.

My question however, pertains to the values of these virtues. If they are not worth a man upholding them until the point of death, then how can they, which are immaterial and completely dependent notions, be worth anything at all. I would argue that better is the man who upholds his virtue, if possible until death released him from such an obligation, merely to prove that we are more than the animal in which we reside.

Recap, Hume on Human Understanding

This write-up is intended to recap some of our most productive areas of discussion over the last week in re Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding :

One of our earliest points of contention with Hume was whether or not everything is ultimately reducible to a single simple impression. The example in question was whether or not we could ever have the simple impression of “blueness” without it coming to us in a complex form—is the simple impression of blue original and basic, or is it simply an abstraction that comes about through the manipulation of our ideas? Although we did not get to a discussion of, say, the complexities of human language, our difficulty in establishing this sensation of “blueness” still speaks to the same anxieties that we had expressed in our discussion questions: if we cannot reduce to simple impressions even an item as simple as a paint chip from Home Depot, is Hume’s insistence on reaching a clarity in ideas through reducing them to their originating impressions threatened?

Another point of contention was Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact; in particular, we seemed to have die-hard Lockeans who were unwilling to be brushed off in re innate ideas as Locke himself is in Hume’s footnote on p. 22. The debate hinged on the a priori (but not innate!) nature of relations of ideas, and it seemed that the problem was in accepting that we could have an ROI without an experience to match it (how can I have the geometric notion of a square without having encountered one?). What ultimately helped to dispel (most) of this disagreement was establishing ROIs as frameworks for structuring experiences, e.g. the principle of identity as an ROI that is necessary for sense perception to even be comprehensible and the ROI of the square as structuring our ideas of a square after these ideas have been occasioned by (and copied from) experience.

We also spent a great deal of time fleshing out Hume’s notions of constant conjunction vs. necessary connection. For some, this observation was commonsensical; having already accepted that the findings of science are at best probabilistic, they readily accepted that we could not know with absolute certainty any power of connection. Given this position, there was a question of whether or not we should abandon all attempts to reason in the world and live in distrust of all our observations of constant conjunction. We arrived at a position, though, like that presented by Hume on p. 41:

Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery.

The principle of Custom or Habit is what compels us to carry on our daily life and reasonings without being paralyzed by the knowledge that we have no way of knowing that our classroom will necessarily exist tomorrow.

Of course, this argument for conjunction over connection was not accepted without question. One particular point of contention was the knowledge of modern science—don’t we know enough to determine by scientific laws why a pin prick causes bleeding? What we determined, however, was that the best science can do is continually subdivide the line between cause and effect by positing ever-smaller chains of cause and effect that never actually determine a necessary connection. We left class on Friday in a certain state of doubt regarding conjunction and connection; given the thought experiment of the wind and the trees, we batted around a few terminological and situational quibbles without coming down in any substantial way on whether or not the wind could be determined as the cause and the movement of the trees determined as the effect. It is likely, however, that we have not abandoned this question and will have reason to return to it in our continued readings of Hume.

Locke Discussion Recap

the week of February 15th to 19th

Mr. John Locke in all his white-haired glory

Due to extensive attention on Descartes (and a few occurrences of wintry weather), our coverage of John Locke was unfortunately truncated. For future reference, however, Caitlyn and I will attempt to recount the main points from our two classes on the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

• John Locke was strongly egalitarian; he was opposed to the Cartesian value of reason because in his view, this simply replaced one set of dogmatic beliefs with another.

• Locke was a empiricist, believing that humans learn everything through experience. Empiricism rejects the notion of an "a priori" idea (something the mind can know without experience). Rationalists, such as Descartes, used universality--the idea that people all share some common knowledge--as the basis for innate ideas. Empiricists, such as Locke, refute this argument, citing "children and idiots" as counter examples.

• In lieu of innate ideas, Locke instead presents the idea of "tabula rasa." Though commonly translated from Latin as "blank slate," this concept does not suggest that the human mind is a void, but rather that it has the potential to receive, store, and develop ideas.

• In Locke's view, the human mind has two means by which to receive ideas: sensation and reflection. Sensation, he argues, is passive; the mind is involuntarily affected by the senses. In contrast, reflection is active internal process, in which the mind considers ideas previously acquired through sensation.

• To illustrate the difference between complex and simple ideas, we used the example of an apple. When one looks at an apple and perceives it to be an apple, this is actually a complex idea. A complex idea is a the combination of multiple simple ideas (for example, color, smell, visual appearance, etc.). These simple ideas cannot be created or destroyed; they are passive, wholly dependent on the object. Once the human mind acquires a simple idea, (for example, the apple is red) this simple idea cannot be "un-known." Conversely, this additionally means that humans cannot fabricate simple ideas (for example, humans cannot conceive of a color outside of the understood spectrum of light).

• A quality is the property of an object that causes an idea in the human mind. All objects have both primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities, such as solidity, bear resemblance to the object itself. Primary qualities cannot be changed. Secondary qualities, such as colors, sounds, tastes, and textures, resemble the primary qualities; however, they are malleable. It is with secondary qualities that humans generally interact, largely because they are easier to perceive.

Hopefully, this was a helpful summation. Please let us know if there are any questions or glaring errors in our report.

--Dancin' Anson and Caitlyn "Socks" Kennedy

Is "non-conscious thought" possible? (questions after Locke)

In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke writes: “For if these words ‘to be in the understanding’ have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding.” (1.II.5)

Although the immediate target of Locke’s remark is the doctrine of innate ideas, and particularly the supposition that certain ideas may be innate without having ever been perceived (as in the minds of children and idiots), his remark nonetheless has farther-reaching implications for the meaning of thought and its relation to consciousness. For in order to counter the claim that certain a priori ideas lie latent within the mind until such occasion as they are made drawn out into active and explicit recognition, he must deny the very intelligibility of such a thing as “unconscious idea.”

While this might strike us a perfectly reasonable and unobjectionable claim, there are certain cases raised by recent neuroscientific research that suggest a perfectly coherent way of understanding thought as an activity that is not primarily or originally an operation with consciousness. That was the point I wanted to make in class yesterday when I referred you to this article on a study that showed predictive patterns of activity in the brains of test subjects prior to their becoming aware of their own supposedly conscious and deliberate decisions to act.


Now clearly the data provided by this one study are open to multiple interpretations, and we should not be too quick to dismiss Locke’s argument on the basis of this evidence. For one thing, although the study was able to produce discrepancies as great as seven seconds between the time of observable brain activity and awareness of choice in test subjects, it is obviously not the case that the delay is so pronounced in all decision-making activities (think of split-second reactions, for example). These results were produced under very controlled conditions that (from what I could gather from the study itself) were meant to exaggerate the delay as much as possible. In any case, I wonder whether you think that these measurable activities in the brain that exist prior to our awareness of them should count as “thoughts” in any meaningful sense. Suppose that one of these subjects were interrupted just after having registered a predictive pattern of brain activity, but just prior to becoming consciously aware of it—would we say that this person had thought?

I’m curious to hear what you all think.

Richard Swinburne and an Argument for Substance Dualism

As promised, here is Dr. Larry Lacy's paper on the subject of Richard Swinburne's argument for substance dualism and Lacy's critique and alternative. This is an argument based on enduring subjects of experience.


Swinburne and Substance Dualism -