Kant's Prolegomena Precis One

Sorry this got posted so late.

Kant’s “Prolegomena” (5-31, 143-158)

Preface:
In the preface, Kant introduces the main idea behind the Prolegomena – whether such a thing as metaphysics is possible at all. He writes that his requirements for metaphysics are the only ones that can determine such a science, and because there has been no such thing before, metaphysics has never really existed. He then speaks of Hume’s questioning of metaphysics, regarding cause and effect, and how others opposed Hume, appealing to sound common sense, which seemed to be the basis of metaphysics previously. Kant then defines sound common sense as a matter of judgments that finds its immediate application in experience, in opposition to speculative understanding, which happens when judgments are made in a universal mode out of mere concepts. Kant ends with the statement that sound common sense has no judgment here, and that in the rest of this writing, he will be constructing metaphysics as a completely new science.

Preamble on the Distinguishing Feature of All Metaphysical Cognition:
In the preamble, Kant writes that in order to understand metaphysics, or the science of knowledge, one must first understand it separately from other sciences. To separate it, he divides metaphysical judgments into two categories – analytical and synthetic. Analytical judgments are those that are explicative and add nothing to the cognition of the judgment. They rest entirely on the principle of contradiction, and are as such a priori knowledge. Synthetic judgments augment the given condition of an object, and can either be a posteriori (empirical), or a priori (arise from understanding or reason). Synthetic judgments include judgments of experience, mathematical judgments, and properly metaphysical judgments.

General Question of Prolegomena – Is metaphysics possible at all?:
In the general question of the Prolegomena, Kant states that the purpose of the Prolegomena is to indicate what needs to be done in order to bring the science of metaphysics around, rather than only presenting it. He says that to do so, one must rely on something already dependable, and therefore must use in majority analytic judgments. However, Kant then states that pure synthetic cognition that is a priori is actual and given, and these are mostly pure mathematics and natural science, because they are known independent of experience.

Prolegomena General Question – How is cognition from pure reason possible?:
In this section, Kant says that since we can understand both analytic propositions (from the principle of contradiction) and synthetic propositions that are a posteriori (from experience and a synthesis of perceptions), we must then move to understanding synthetic propositions that are a priori. One would usually think that only experience can provide us with the connection of one concept to another, through a long-standing habit, however, to refute such, Kant uses the examples of pure mathematics and pure natural science. He then poses the four questions of 1 → how is pure mathematics possible? 2 → how is pure natural science possible? 3 → how is metaphysics in general possible? and 4 → how is metaphysics as science possible?

Preface to the Second Edition – To Metaphysics:
In the preface, Kant writes that, in order to understand a priori knowledge, intuition must not conform to the constitution of the objects, but instead the object must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition. That is to say, we must not say we know things because of what we see in the object, but instead understand the object because of what we know already. He writes that in cognition that is a priori, nothing can be attributed to objects except what the thinking subject takes from itself. Therefore, in order to cognize an object, we must understand a corresponding intuition, or think of the object as a thing in itself, and we then can cognize the object through appearance. When we cognize something, we then do both – understand its appearance in accordance with natural law (which makes it not free), and understand it in accordance with its ability to belong as a thing to itself (as being free). This is both sensory and intellectual understanding. Kant then goes on to talk about the Critique as a necessary preliminary foundation for the advancement of metaphysics as a science.

Introduction & The Transcendental Document of Elements:
In this section, Kant introduces the special science of the Critique of Pure Reason. He writes that reason is the faculty that supplies the principles of a priori cognition, and states that he is trying to understand a priori synthesis. He then defines intuition as a relation to objects immediately (a purely sensational data), and sensibility as how we obtain representations through the way in which we are affected by the object. Sensibility gives us the object, which then gives intuition, and is then the appearance. He then splits appearance into the “matter of appearance” which corresponds to the sensation, and is a posteriori, and the “form of appearance” which is that in which sensations can be ordered and arranged, and is a priori. Kant writes that pure representations (or pure intuition) are those which are not found by the senses, and therefore a priori. These are extension and shape. The science of these a priori principles of sensibility are called the transcendental aesthetic. In such, Kant says that he will isolate sensibility by taking away all additions through concepts, and then separating out all sensation, leaving only an a priori understandings of two things – space and time.

Questions:

1. Kant writes that sound common sense has no ground in metaphysics, due to their direct application of experience, but then says some synthetic judgments can be empirical. Are those synthetic judgments not then considered as sound common sense?

2. Kant writes that an understanding of an object is both free and not free, but says that it is not a contradiction. How is this so?